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Abstract: Dummett’s justification procedures are revisited. They are used
as background for the discussion of some conceptual and technical issues
in proof-theoretic semantics, especially the role played by assumptions in
proof-theoretic definitions of validity.
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1 The placeholder view of assumptions
In his contribution to the Logica Yearbook 2007, Schroeder-Heister (2008,
§ 3) pointed out some dogmas of proof-theoretic semantics. One of the dog-
mas was the the primacy of the categorical over the hypothetical, or, as it
was latter called, the placeholder view of assumptions.
According to this dogma, hypothetical arguments, or arguments with
open assumptions, should be reduced to closed arguments, or closed proofs
(proofs from no assumptions). In other words, assumptions are consid-
ered to be placeholders for closed proofs. The proof-theoretic definitions
of validity for arguments proposed by Prawitz (1971, 1973, 2006, 2014) are
prominent examples of the placeholder view of assumptions.
1.1 The problem with reduction ad absurdum arguments
In intuitionistic logic, reductio ad absurdum can be used to obtain negative
sentences, or refutations. In such arguments, a contradiction (which in nat-
ural deduction systems is usually represented by an absurdity constant) is
deduced from a collection of assumptions which are thereby shown to be
jointly contradictory, or incompatible.
1I thank the organizers and participants of LOGICA 2016 for the stimulating environment
provided for the discussion of themes related to my research. This work was supported by
Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (DAAD), grant number 91562976.
141
Hermógenes Oliveira
The task of explaining the validity of arguments that use reductio ad ab-
surdum becomes problematic when assumptions are considered placehold-
ers for closed proofs and validity is explained as a constructive function
from closed proofs of the assumptions to closed proofs of the conclusion,
because the explanation then needs to appeal to proofs of contradictions.
These proofs do not need to be actual proofs, but must be at least possible
or conceivable if the explanation is to be at all comprehensible. Whether
proofs of contradictions can be conceived, or what does it mean to conceive
such things, is one of the questions that the advocates of the placeholder
view have to deal with.
In some sense, the conundrum with reductio ad absurdum is reminiscent
of a problem that Prawitz (1971, § IV.1.1) already dealt with in his first at-
tempt at defining a proof-theoretic notion of validity. There, the problem
was the vacuous validation of implications with an unprovable antecedent.
Prawitz’s solution was to reformulate the semantic clause for implication
so as to consider extensions of the underlying atomic system where the an-
tecedent would be provable.2 However, the problem becomes much more
prominent when dealing with contradictions, because our intuition is that
they are not supposed to be provable under any circumstances whatsoever.
1.2 The primacy of assertion
Walking side by side with the placeholder view of assumptions is what we
can call the primacy of assertion over other speech acts. The rationale is
that the speech act of assertion comes with a commitment on the part of the
speaker to offer justifications for the asserted sentence and thus, in order to
correctly assert the sentence, the speaker must be in possession of such jus-
tifications, or be able to produce them. In other words, in order to correctly
assert a sentence, one needs to have a proof of the sentence.
From this picture emerges an approach to proof-theoretic semantics based
on assertibility conditions, with proofs acting as justifications associated
with assertions. Here, another dogma discussed by Schroeder-Heister (2008,
§ 3) comes into play: the transmission view of consequence. But, in contrast
with semantics based on truth conditions, instead of truth, it is correct as-
sertibility which is transmitted from premisses to conclusion in valid argu-
ments. Or, if one prefers to talk about what makes an assertion correct, or
2Unfortunately, the amendment was still insufficient to avoid validation of classical infer-
ences in the implication fragment (Sanz, Piecha, & Schroeder-Heister, 2014, § 4).
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justified, one can say that consequence transmits proof instead of truth. As
a result, the approach assumes a distinctively epistemological character.
However, more complications related to hypothetical reasoning surface:
it seems counterintuitive, to say the least, to hold that a speaker engaged in
a hypothetical argument is committed to the assertion of either the assump-
tions or the conclusion of the argument. As a matter of fact, the speaker may
even reject them and, given the argument is valid, her reasoning remains
unassailable. In particular, the point reappears with renewed force when
considered in the context of arguments that use reductio ad absurdum, since
it would commit us to the possibility of correctly asserting absurdities.
One can appeal to a concept of conditional assertion to try and salvage
the approach from such objections while preserving an unified explanatory
model based primarily on assertion and proof. Thus, the conclusions of
hypothetical arguments are taken not to be asserted outright but only under
certain conditions. That is, the conclusions of hypothetical arguments are
conditionally asserted. In terms of speech acts, however, it is not at all clear
whether conditional assertion constitutes any assertion at all.
It seems to me that trying to explain deductive validity in terms of as-
sertions and proofs is misguided. I am not trying to deny that deductive
reasoning has epistemic importance or that deductive reasoning transmits
evidence, or justification, from the premisses to the conclusion. If there
is a deductive relation between premisses and conclusion, then, of course,
the correct assertion of the premisses would lead to the correct assertion of
the conclusion and, similarly, if proof for the premisses are provided then a
proof for the conclusion is obtained. Rather, I contend that to explain de-
ductive validity by reducing it to this transmission effect is to put the cart
before the horse and confuse the cause with its effects, the disease with its
symptoms.
2 BHK vs Gentzen
Proof-theoretic notions of validity have often been inspired by a mixture of
ideas involving the BHK interpretation of the logical constants and Gentzen’s
well-known remarks on the rules of natural deduction. In particular, the con-
ception of validity underlying the placeholder view of assumptions is largely
informed by the BHK interpretation of implication: an argument from A to
B is valid if, and only if, every proof of A can be transformed into a proof
of B. Yet, with its unqualified reference to proofs, this view is not immedi-
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ately amenable to the recursive treatment required of semantic clauses and
definitions (Prawitz, 2007, § 2.1). In this context, Gentzen’s ideas are often
developed into a notion of canonical proof in order to achieve recursiveness
for an approach primarily based on the BHK interpretation.
On the other hand, the core of Gentzen’s ideas are independent of the
BHK interpretation. They are best represented by what became known as
proof-theoretic harmony. Harmony, as a fundamental principle of natural
deduction systems, applies equally well to deductions from assumptions as
to the particular case of proofs (deductions from no assumptions). By ap-
pealing to harmony while at the same time avoiding the BHK interpretation
and the placeholder view of assumptions, we can develop a more appropri-
ate proof-theoretic notion of validity.
2.1 A more Gentzenian approach to validity
The introduction rules for a logical constant γ can be seen as an explanation
of the canonical use of a sentence as a conclusion in a deductive argument
(where, of course, γ is the sentence’s main connective). This is achieved
by exhibiting the conditions for obtaining a sentence A γ B as a conclusion
of an argument (where γ is a binary connective). In the paradigmatic case,
these conditions are expressed in terms of the component sentences A and
B.3
In an analogous manner, the elimination rules for a logical constant can
be seen as an explanation of the canonical use of a sentence as an assump-
tion in a deductive argument. This is accomplished by exhibiting the con-
sequences that can be extracted from the sentence (as a major premiss of an
elimination rule, possibly in the context of some minor premisses).
Thus, introduction and elimination rules stand for two distinct aspects
of the deductive use of the logical constants. Harmony arises as a require-
ment of balance between those two aspects such that there is a equilibrium
between what is required by the introduction rules and what consequences
are extracted by the elimination rules. As a result, among other things, har-
mony guarantees that there is nothing to be gained by performing round-
about derivations where sentences are obtained by an introduction rule to be
immediately after analysed by the corresponding elimination rule. There-
fore, for a proper understanding of the deductive practice, it suffices to look
3Notice that the conditions do not necessarily need to be expressed in terms of closed proofs
of A and B, but can be expressed in terms of assumptions A and B or of arguments for A and
B which may depend on other assumptions.
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at the collection of direct derivations, also known as normal derivations.
The normal derivations have a very perspicuous form (Prawitz, 1965,
Chapter IV, § 2, Theorem 2). They are composed of (can be divided into)
two parts: an analytic part, where the assumptions are analysed (destructed),
and a synthetic part, where the conclusion is synthesized (constructed) from
the components resulted from the analysis.4
assumptions5} analysis
(eliminations)
minimal
components4} synthesis
(introductions)
conclusion
The equilibrium between introductions and eliminations suggest that,
if we were to supplement the assumptions on top through a process of in-
version by backward application of introductions, we would arrive at the
minimal components required for the synthetic part. And, similarly, if we
were to complement the conclusion by forward application of eliminations,
we would arrive at the minimal components resulted from the analysis of
the assumptions. Accordingly, the harmonious inferential behaviour of the
logical constants has sometimes been expressed by pointing out that intro-
ductions and eliminations can be, in some sense, obtained from one another
by inversion principles.
Gentzen’s investigations into logical deduction can thus supply the basic
pieces for a proof-theoretical notion of logical validity for arguments based
on the inferential meaning conferred on the logical constants by either their
introduction rules or their elimination rules. In particular with respect to
the problems discussed in the previous section, the Gentzenian approach
has the advantage of giving proper heed to assumptions and being fairly
independent from specific speech acts.5
4In the general case, each of these parts can, of course, be empty.
5For instance, deductive arguments can be used to show someone who denies the conclusion
that she has to deny at least one of the assumptions. They can also be used to explore the
consequences of a conjecture. These applications of deductive arguments align very well with
the Gentzenian approach, but none of them necessarily involves anyone making any assertions.
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Gentzen’s ideas suggest that, although a persistent dogma in much of
the discussion around proof-theoretic semantics, the placeholder view of as-
sumptions can be challenged from an authentic proof-theoretic perspective.
In the next section, I revisit Dummett’s justification procedures. I argue that,
as a development of the Gentzenian approach just sketched, they afford a no-
tion of proof-theoretic validity that incorporates assumptions in an essential
way.6
I stay at the level of the core concepts, without going into rigorous defi-
nitions. Nonetheless, I hope that my explanations would be sufficient to give
an overall idea of the relationship between the justification procedures (how
they can be understood as emerging from a shared framework) and I also
presume to have provided enough detail so that an interested and motivated
reader would be able to attempt rigorous definitions of her own based on the
approach outlined. In the last section, I discuss, to some extent, how Dum-
mett’s procedures perform with respect to adequacy to intuitionistic logic,
especially in comparison with approaches that endorse the placeholder view
of assumptions.
3 An overview of Dummett’s approach
Dummett (1991, Chapter 11–13) proposed two proof-theoretic justification
procedures for logical laws which amount to definitions of logical validity
for arguments. The “verificationist” procedure defines validity of arguments
on the basis of introduction rules for logical constants and the “pragmatist”
procedure defines validity of arguments on the basis of elimination rules for
logical constants.7
These proof-theoretic justification procedures play an important role in
Dummett’s philosophical anti-realist programme. They are central pieces
of his very detailed and elaborate argument for rejection of classical logic
in favor of intuitionistic logic.8 In particular, Dummett (1975, 1991) has
6It is important to notice that, although the Dummettian approach that I advocate rejects the
placeholder view of assumptions, other dogmatic characteristics, like the unidirectional and
global character of the semantics, remain unchallenged (Schroeder-Heister, 2016, § 2.3 and
2.4).
7I adopt the characterizations “verificationist” and “pragmatist” from Dummett. However,
without denying their existence, I do not imply with the adoption of the terminology any con-
nections outside the domain of logical validity. Therefore, I refer to verificationism and prag-
matism just as markers to distinguish between approaches to validity based on introduction
rules and elimination rules, respectively.
8At the end of this argument, Dummett (1991, p. 300) writes: “We took notice of the
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conjectured that proof-theoretic notions of validity would justify exactly in-
tuitionistic logic.
Dummett’s definitions of validity are based on canonical inference rules
for the logical constants. These inference rules are thought to fix the mean-
ing of the logical constants by displaying their canonical deductive use.
They are, in Dummett’s terminology, “self-justifying”.
In contrast with some definitions found in the literature, Dummett’s def-
initions are not based on semantic clauses for particular logical constants.
Instead, he assumes that self-justifying rules are given. These self-justifying
rules are introduction rules in the context of the verificationist procedure,
and elimination rules in the context of the pragmatist procedure. In both
procedures, the definitions are stated irrespective of the particular constants
or rules provided. Therefore, Dummett’s definitions can, at least in prin-
ciple, be applied without modification to different logics by providing the
appropriate self-justifying rules for the logical constants.
3.1 Core concepts
Both the verificationist and the pragmatist procedures can be seen as prod-
ucts of a basic common framework. The core notions of validity behind the
justification procedures can be informally outlined as follows:
verificationism whenever the assumptions can be obtained in a canonical
manner, the conclusion can also be obtained in a canonical manner
pragmatism any consequence that can be drawn in a canonical manner
from the conclusion can also be drawn in a canonical manner from
the assumptions.
The expression “canonical manner” is an allusion to canonical argu-
ments. As usual in proof-theoretic notions of validity, canonical arguments
are the main ingredients of the justification procedures. An important fea-
ture, however, is that Dummett’s canonical arguments are not closed proofs,
problem what metalanguage is to be used in giving a semantic explanation of a logic to one
whose logic is different. A metalanguage whose underlying logic is intuitionistic now appears
a good candidate for the role, since its logical constants can be understood, and its logical laws
acknowledged, without appeal to any semantic theory and with only a very general meaning-
theoretical background. If that is not the right logic, at least it may serve as a medium by means
of which to discuss other logics.”
147
Hermógenes Oliveira
but instead may depend on assumptions. Consequently, when precisely for-
mulated, the definitions of validity must take into account the assumptions
on which the canonical arguments depend.
The canonical arguments are composed primarily of canonical infer-
ences. However, they cannot be required to be entirely composed of canon-
ical inferences. They must allow for the possibility of subordinate subar-
guments, that is, subarguments cultivated under the support of additional
assumptions (Dummett, 1991, p. 260). These subordinate subarguments,
when not already canonical arguments themselves, are critical subargu-
ments. They are critical in the sense that the validity of the original canonical
argument would recursively depend on their validity. This means, of course,
that much care should be dispensed to guarantee that critical subarguments
are of lower complexity than the original canonical argument.
In a verificationist context, critical subarguments are detected through
the presence of assumption discharge. In a pragmatist context, they are
detected through the presence of minor premisses. These signs indicate, in
their respective contexts, when assumptions are being added.
Now, returning to our informal notions of validity, in the verificationist
procedure, the means to evaluate the conditions under which the assump-
tions may be obtained in a canonical manner are provided by supplemen-
tations. They result from substitution of the assumptions with canonical
arguments. In the pragmatist procedure, the means to evaluate what conse-
quences can be drawn from the conclusion are provided by complementa-
tions. They result from substitution of the conclusion with canonical argu-
ments.
verificationism pragmatism
canonical arguments canonical arguments
(primarily introductions) (primarily eliminations)
critical subarguments critical subarguments
(revealed by assumption discharges) (revealed by minor premises)
supplementation complementation
(assumptions canonically unfolded) (conclusion canonically unfolded)
Instead of as substitution operations, one can see the processes of supple-
mentation and complementation more dynamically. The process of supple-
mentation can be seen as the repeated backward application of introduction
rules from the assumptions, thus growing the argument upwards, which is
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why Dummett also refers to the verificationist procedure as the upwards jus-
tification procedure. Similarly, the process of complementation can be seen
as the repeated forward application of elimination rules to the conclusion of
the argument as a major premiss, thus growing the argument downwards,
which is why Dummett also refers to the pragmatist procedure as the down-
wards justification procedure.
In order to appraise the validity of an argument from Γ toC, the verifica-
tionist procedure examines its supplementations and investigates whether a
canonical argument for C can be attained under the same conditions. Since
supplementations result from canonical arguments for Γ, they may depend
on assumptions ∆ (remember that canonical arguments may depend on as-
sumptions). Then, the canonical argument for C may not depend on other
assumptions besides ∆.
In an analogous manner, in order to appraise the validity of an argument
from Γ to C, the pragmatist procedure examines the complementations and
investigates whether a canonical argument for the conclusion of the com-
plementation, say Z, can be attained under the same conditions. Because
complementations result from canonical arguments from C (as assumption
and major premiss of elimination), they may depend on additional assump-
tions ∆ required by minor premisses. Then, the canonical argument for Z
may not depend on other assumptions besides Γ,∆.
Supplementation Complementation
∆, [A]
...
B
A→ B
...
Γ
C
Γ
C
, ∆
...
A→ B
...
A
B
...
Z
The canonical arguments used to supplement or complement may have
critical subarguments. In the figures above, I indicate the form of possible
supplementations and complementations of an illustrative argument from Γ
to C. In the supplementation, the subargument from ∆, A to B may be
critical. In the complementation, the subargument for the minor premiss A
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of→E may be critical (for instance, if validly, but not canonically, obtained
from assumptions in ∆).
3.2 An illustrative example
With the help of the concepts explained so far, let us try and show the va-
lidity of an argument according to the pragmatist procedure. Since I did not
gave any rigorous definitions, our validation of the argument must be car-
ried out in an informal and intuitive manner. Still, we adhere to the overall
pragmatist approach and appeal exclusively to the elimination rules for the
logical constants.
A→ (B ∧ C)
(A→ B) ∧ (A→ C)
According to the pragmatist procedure, the argument depicted above
would be valid if whatever consequences can be drawn from the conclu-
sion in a canonical manner, can also be drawn from the assumptions in a
canonical manner. In order to see what can be extracted canonically from
the conclusion, we complement:
A→ (B ∧ C)
(A→ B) ∧ (A→ C)
A→ B A
B
A→ (B ∧ C)
(A→ B) ∧ (A→ C)
A→ C A
C
The complementations were obtained by application of elimination rules un-
til we arrived at a simple schematic letter (each consequence being the major
premiss for the next application of an elimination rule). Let us concede that
there is no loss of generality when we supply the minor premiss of→E with
a simple assumption A. So, as we can see, we have two complementations,
with conclusions B and C, respectively, and assumptions A → (B ∧ C)
and A. In order to show validity, we must find canonical arguments from
A→ (B ∧ C) and A to B, and from A→ (B ∧ C) and A to C.9
9The assumptions of the complementations happen to be the same in this case. In the
general case, however, they have to be considered separately, e.g. each complementation has
its own assumptions. In order to establish validity, we must show that the conclusion of the
complementation can be obtained from the assumptions of the complementation, for every
complementation.
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A→ (B ∧ C) A
B ∧ C
B
A→ (B ∧ C) A
B ∧ C
C
The example is a rather simple one (it does not involve, for instance,
canonical arguments with critical subarguments). But it illustrates how a
nontrivial argument (an argument whose derivation would need both elim-
inations and introductions) can be justified by appealing exclusively to the
meaning conferred on the logical constants by their elimination rules.
4 Adequacy to intuitionistic logic
Sanz et al. (2014, § 4) showed that, in the fragment containing only im-
plication, a strictly classical inference, Peirce’s rule, is valid at the atomic
level with respect to a proof-theoretic notion of validity proposed by Prawitz
(1971, § IV.1.2). With implication already behaving classically at the atomic
level, and assuming the validity of the usual rules for implication, conjunc-
tion and absurdity (but no disjunction), the result can be generalized to ar-
bitrary complex sentences. As a consequence, we can have a set of logical
constants powerful enough to account for all classically valid inferences in
propositional logic (with the other constants being defined in terms of im-
plication, conjunction, and absurdity).
In the context of Dummett’s anti-realist philosophical programme, these
kinds of results can have a very negative effect. They show that, contrary
to what is intended, classical logic can be validated in a proof-theoretic set-
ting, even when no classical principles are admitted in the semantics. De-
spite Dummett (1991, Chapter 15), there would be classical logic without
bivalence (Sandqvist, 2009). Furthermore, the arguments used to establish
these results can be expected to apply to any proof-theoretic notion based
on the BHK view of implication and conservative extensions of production
systems.
In contrast with Prawitz’s early approach, Dummett’s verificationist pro-
cedure does not adhere to the BHK view of implication as based on closed
proofs, and is not conservative over extensions of production systems. Still,
the verificationist procedure, as defined by Dummett (1991, p. 260), does
not reject completely the placeholder view of assumptions, because the as-
sumptions of canonical arguments are required to be atomic. As a result,
from the point of view of a general approach to logical validity, too much
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emphasis is placed on the underlying atomic system and validity then ceases
to be a schematic notion.10
One may be inclined to think that Dummett’s approach based on atomic
assumptions is basically equivalent to approaches based on production sys-
tems because atomic assumptions could be replaced by atomic axioms. How-
ever, the presupposition of monotonicity incorporated into production sys-
tems (by requiring that extensions of the production system be conservative)
does not carry over to collections of assumptions. For instance, Goldfarb
(2016, Counterexample 2) observed that, if the production system has no
rules, the argument from ϕ → ψ to ψ is valid (where ϕ and ψ are atomic
sentences). If the production system is extended with the rule ϕ/ψ, the ar-
gument ceases to be valid, which shows that verificationist validity is not
monotonic over extensions of the production system.11
As a consequence, under the verificationist procedure with atomic as-
sumptions, the atomic base cannot be correctly interpreted as expandable
states of knowledge in the model of mathematics where, once a sentence is
proved, it remains proved. Rather, conclusions cultivated under the support
of some assumptions may not be available under other assumptions, and it
is not intuitively compelling to restrict hypothetical arguments to conserva-
tively extended collections of assumptions.
Since the arguments that show validation of Peirce’s rule rely on the
monotonicity of the atomic base, it is reasonable to expect that Dummett’s
verificationist procedure escapes validation of Peirce’s rule, even in an atomic
level. So, I would say that Dummett’s procedure compares favourably in this
respect with approaches based on closed proofs and conservative extensions
of production systems.12
On the other hand, Dummett’s pragmatist procedure incorporates as-
10I agree with Goldfarb’s (2016, § 4) assessment that Dummett’s strategy, inspired by the
BHK interpretation, of defining validity for actual sentences and then generalizing this notion
in order to achieve logical validity is problematic.
11Disregarding other problematic features of the verificationist procedure, I agree with
Michael Dummett and Ofra Magidor that Counterexample 2 is not really worrisome (Goldfarb,
2016, Postscript). In this context, the absence of atomic rules are more correctly interpreted,
not as the absence of knowledge about the inferential relations between atomic sentences, but
instead as the knowledge that there are no inferential relations between atomic sentences.
12Goldfarb (2016, Counterexample 3) pointed out another problem with the verificationist
procedure: the validation of the intuitionistically underivable rule of distribution of implication
over disjunction. Since proof-theoretic approaches based on closed proofs and conservative
extensions are also affected (Piecha, Sanz, & Schroeder-Heister, 2015, § 4), I suspect the roots
of the problem here are more profound than the mere format of the atomic base, or the fact that
assumptions are restricted to atomic sentences.
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sumptions entirely (atomic and complex). As a matter of fact, in the prag-
matist sense, the paradigmatic canonical argument is hypothetical. This is
perfectly aligned with the view, formulated earlier, that the elimination rules
express the deductive canonical use of sentences as assumptions. As a re-
sult, the pragmatist procedure is not subject to any of the objections raised
in Section 1. It fits better with investigations grounded on other speech acts
besides assertion and provides a more perceptive explanation of the meaning
of conjectures and the validity of arguments that use reductio ad absurdum.
Furthermore, in contrast with the verificationist case, a little reflection
shows that the pragmatist notion of validity is schematic. In particular, sup-
pose some arbitrary atomic rules determining the inferential relationships
between atomic sentences are supplied. These rules could be applied to the
atomic conclusion of a canonical argument in order to extract further atomic
consequences. Now, consider, for instance, our example in Section 3.2. It
is easy to see that, even if B or C were complex, any further elimination
or atomic rules applied in the complementations could be transferred to the
canonical arguments without adding any assumptions with respect to the
complementations.
Finally, I would like to suggest that the pragmatist procedure may offer a
notion of validity more adequate with respect to intuitionistic logic. To this
effect, I argue informally that atomic Peirce’s rule is not valid according to
the pragmatist procedure.
Claim 1 Let ϕ and ψ be atomic sentences. Then, Peirce’s rule
(ϕ→ ψ) → ϕ
ϕ
is not valid with respect to the pragmatist procedure.
Informal argument. The conclusion ϕ is already an atomic sentence, there-
fore there is nothing to complement. Now, we need to ask ourselves whether
it is possible to obtain a valid canonical argument for ϕ from (ϕ→ ψ) → ϕ.
Any such valid canonical argument will have (ϕ → ψ) → ϕ as major pre-
miss of →E.
(ϕ→ ψ) → ϕ (ϕ→ ψ)
ϕ
At this point, since (ϕ → ψ) was not among the available assumptions,
Peirce’s rule would be valid only if we could validly deduce (ϕ→ ψ) from
no assumptions (a critical subargument). But this is not the case, because
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complementations of (ϕ → ψ) will have ψ as conclusion with only ϕ as
assumption
(ϕ→ ψ) ϕ
ψ
and there is no general way to obtain a canonical argument for ψ from ϕ
unless, of course, in the particular cases where ψ = ϕ or ψ can be extracted
from ϕ by accepted atomic inferences.
Since I favored a more conceptual discussion in detriment of technical
developments, I am not able to produce here a more rigorous proof of this
claim. But I still hope that my informal discussion and explanations deliver
some evidence for the adequacy of the pragmatist procedure to intuitionistic
logic.
Perhaps I should not end without a warning. While revisiting Dummett’s
procedures, my agenda was to advance what I think is a more appropriate
approach to proof-theoretic validity. As a consequence, I may have pre-
sented the justification procedures under a perspective at odds with Dum-
mett’s own.13 Albeit exegetical correctness were obviously not among my
primary concerns, I do believe that Dummett’s procedures supply the essen-
tial elements for an interesting proof-theoretic notion of validity, one that
is free from the influence of the BHK interpretation and rejects completely
the placeholder view of assumptions. I attempted, so to say, to separate the
wheat from the chaff.
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